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MARITIME AGREEMENTS WITH
STATE TRADERS
JON MAGNUSSON*
INTRODUCTION
Wouldn't it be nice if a perfectly operating open market trading
system were an assured condition for our merchant marine. We hear
the merchant marine is expensive, inefficient and uncompetitive. Under
a well-functioning free enterprise market every ocean carrier would
pursue his business assured that if he were efficient he would be re-
warded; his price would reflect the quality of service; he could make
speedy service changes to meet shippers' needs without asking the
government's permission; he would not have to pay anyone to remove
a threat of injury, but only for services rendered; he would bargain on
terms of relative equality; and, his contract obligations would be re-
spected and enforced. It would be a world where there were no penal-
ties on useful service to the public. Our merchant marine would be
efficient and competitive. We know, of course, this ideal condition is
just a utopian dream.
The real world of ocean commerce is not so nice and rosy. On the
contrary, in some parts of the world trade routes are beset by penalties
on useful service. There is gross inequality of bargaining, expensive
payments to avoid commercial injury are necessary, government re-
strictions are prerequisites to service changes (in the name of public
interest, of course), quotas are imposed on tonnages or products that
may be carried, governmental price restraints are imposed, and worst of
all there is no assurance of contract enforcement. These conditions seem
to be most prevalent and most penalizing along trade routes where
governments participate directly in ocean transportation by operating
ocean carriers (herein "state traders"), rather than leaving operations
to private citizens. There is a very good reason for these adverse condi-
tions. The origin of the conditions is the absolute inequality of the
state trader vis-i-vis any private citizen, in competition, in contract
negotiation, and contract enforcement.
UNEQUAL ADVANTAGES OF STATE TRADERS
The inequality between a government and its citizens need not be
belabored, but its consequences when the two try to operate on equal
0Ass't General Counsel, Maritime Administration 1967-70; B.S., University of Virginia,
1935; J.D., George Washington School of Law, 1937.
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terms are not so well understood. Antiquity supports the inequality
and we have the following from The First Book of the Kings:
And Samuel told all the words of the Lord unto the people that
asked of him a king. And he said, this will be the manner of the
king that shall reign over you: He will take your sons and appoint
them for himself, for his chariots, and to be his horsemen; and some
shall run before his chariots. And he will appoint him captains
over thousands, and captains over fifties; and will set them to make
his instruments of war, and instruments of his chariots. And he
will take your daughters to be confectionaries, and to be cooks and
bakers. And he will take your fields, and your vineyards and your
oliveyards, even the best of them, and given them to his servants.
And he will take the tenth of your seed, and of your vineyards, and
give to his officers, and to his servants.... And ye shall cry out
in that day because of your king which ye shall have chosen you;
and the Lord will not hear you in that day.1
Hobbes concludes the Leviathan with:
And thus I have brought to an end by Discourse of Civil and
Ecclesiastical Government . . . without other design than to set
before men's eyes the mutual relation between protection and
obedience; of which the condition of human nature and the laws
divine, both natural and positive, require an inviolable observa-
tion.2
The unequal relation of subject to sovereign, then, is not open to ques-
tion, but the implications are sometimes overlooked and the lessons
ignored.
Before discussing the effect of state traders on our commerce a
few examples from the adjudications of a government agency, the
Federal Maritime Commission3 (Commission), reveal how these pen-
alties operate in the real world of ocean commerce.
SOME SPECIFIC ExAMPLES
The similarity of the facts provided by cases involving commerce
with two South American nations are good illustrations of what may be
expected from other state trading nations. Venezuela, Brazil and several
other countries in South America use state agencies to transport their
ocean commerce and have promoted their use by different restrictive
practices, but with the same effect.
A. The Venezuelan Pooling Agreement
Through government agencies Venezuela holds the stock of Com-
pania Anonima Venezolana de Navigacion (CAVN) an ocean carrier
1Samuel 8: 10-18.
2 1 CoLLuR CLASCS IN THE HISTORY or THouGHTf 511 (1966).
3 Established by Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1961, § 191(a), 75 Stat. 840.
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known as its "national line."4 After pressures on shippers to use the
national line failed, inducements imposed by governmental decrees
were substituted. One decree exempted cargo, called "exonerated"
cargo, from import duties, and another decree made shipment on the
national line or on "its associated services" a condition of exoneration
i.e. tax exemption. 5 An "associated service" was defined as any other
carrier which had an agreement with the national line regulating trans-
portation. The decision as to eligibility for exoneration was made by
the Minister of Development, a government agent, after he examined
the agreement with an associated carrier. Government compulsion was
thus established by legislation and administrative decision, with the
state's taxing power as a sanction. Effectiveness of the power was shown
by the fact that from 1960 to 1961 Grace Lines' carryings went down
about 5%, Alcoa's (another U.S. company operating ships from Vene-
zuela) already low participation decreased 3%, while CAVN's carry-
ings rose 7%. To overcome further loss of business Grace Lines
negotiated an agreement with CAVN to become an associated carrier
and between the two they agreed on percentages of specified cargoes
each would transport.
To assure itself some equality of bargaining power before the
agreement was closed, Grace prevailed on the Commission to propose
"rules and regulations to meet conditions unfavorable to shipping"
authorized by section 19(l)(b) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920.6
The rules were preceded by explicit references to the Venezuelan de-
crees and provided that the Federal Maritime Board (a predecessor of
the Commission) would impose charges on CAVN to offset any added
expenses to others caused by "diversion of cargo from United States
flag vessels." 7 The proposed so-called rule departed from the usual re-
quirement that a rule be preceded by public notice and comment, was
not of general applicability and applied only to CAVN, making it more
an administrative threat than a true rule. To assure direct communica-
tion the FMC said: "These regulations, although never put into effect,
were made available to the Venezuelan Government through the De-
partment of State in June 1961." The threatening regulations had the
desired effect. Negotiations were completed, and Grace obtained "an
instrument to secure for each party access to cargo it would otherwise
4 Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Cia. Anonima Venezolana, 7 F.M.C. 345, 347 (1962).
5Id. at 348, 349. Decrees No. 255, March 18, 1960 and No. 331, March 10, 1961. The
latter provided: "The total or partial exemption from import duties ... is predicated upon
the obligation ... to transport ... by means of the CAVN or its associated services."
646 U.S.C. § 876 (1964).
7 7 F.M.C. 345, App. III, at 376, 379 (1962).
[Vol. 46:48
MARITIME AGREEMENTS
be denied."8 The agreement obligated each carrier to pay the other for
excessive carryings according to a formula in the agreement. Alcoa was
denied participation.
The effectiveness of state power to reallocate the quantity of cargo
a carrier might carry was clearly shown by these facts. Time consuming
diplomacy (of sorts) was shown by the fumbling with the spurious
rules.
B. The Brazilian Pooling Agreement
The United States of Brazil owned and operated Lloyd Brazileiro
(Brazileiro) a state trading enterprise, which was also called its national
line. At its head was a director appointed by the President of the
Republic, and directly subordinate to the Minister of Transportation
and Public Works.9 The carrier failed to obtain all the business it
wanted in international markets and governmental action was substi-
tuted for sales effort and superior service by competitors.10 National
rights, prestige and public welfare were also factors in negotiations.1
Instead of tax exemption incentives for favored shippers, Brazil's
method of compulsion to achieve predominance and greater rights,
was to require by decree that all of its exports to the United States
and Canada be carried by steamship companies which were members
of a named conference 1 2 of which Brazileiro was a member. Enforce-
ment was achieved through control over loading permits by the Bank
of Brazil Bank Fiscalization. No cargo could be loaded on a ship
without the permit. When an earlier agreement expired, negotiations
for a new agreement, drastically reducing the share of coffee carryings
8 Id. App. I, at 366.
) See 8 F.M.C. 213, 235-37 (1964) where the facts are described.
10 Id. at 239. The following testimony shows what motivated the Brazilians: . .. this
is a national line . . . I am willing even to recognize that my own service may be
bad; but accusing Moore-McCormack of bad service makes no sense . . ." It is significant
also to note that "bad service" is admitted, but thought to be without relevance in view
of public welfare considerations.
11Id. at 238-39. The Brazilian representative said: "They [the national lines] have a
greater right than any of you may think that you have .... My Government could very
well ... demand that a quite greater percentage of this commerce remain between the U.S.
and the Brazilian lines .... You have the obligation to understand that our situation is
such a one that we cannot afford the luxury ... to let this trade escape our hands .. "
Later a Brazilian Merchant Marine Commission resolution in "Diario Officel" of Novem-
ber 14, 1967 refers expressly to the "principles of the Brazilian Maritime Transportation
Policy, with predominance of national flag lines .. ." Other statements of preference and
compulsion decrees are in Res. No. 2,995 of the Merchant Marine Commission 1303 D.O.,
June 5, 1967, and Res. No. 3131 of the same Commission, Nov. 10, 1967. See F.M.C. Nos.
67-47, 48 (Feb. 15, 1968).
12A voluntary association of ocean carriers which agree among themselves as to the
freight rates to be charged along the trade route they serve.
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allowed a Norwegian line, was proposed in spite of large past payments
to Brazileiro. Under the revenue pooling allocations of the expiring
agreement, $833,810.51 had been set aside by foreign lines simply as
payment to Brazileiro for not carrying coffee. The Norwegians refused
to agree to the reduction - at first. This refusal was followed by denial
of loading permits and for a short time they carried no coffee.The
message was clear. Negotiations were immediately resumed, but just to
make sure no one misunderstood the shape-up or ship-out-of-the-trade
message, the excluded carrier was told by the Brazilian representative
"that a quite greater percentage of this commerce" could "remain
between the U.S. and the Brazilian lines." He continued: "We have
told Mr. Lorentzen that he has now reached a level beyond which he
cannot go. Isn't this clear enough now?" An American line represent-
ative with the bravery of having a big brother in reserve, chimed in on
this hard line with a specific time deadline: "I think we have advised
Mr. Lorentzen that a reasonable time has already passed.., if he does
not accept by noon tomorrow, we see no other alternative than to form
a new pool," without the Norwegian line. In this case the U.S. carriers
were satisfied with their quotas and the North and South American
carriers were victimizing the European carriers. Needless to say that
after such demands, threats and presentation of alternatives in the
name of negotiation Mr. Lorentzen signed, but not until remarking,
".... in view of the existence of regulations [such as decrees] we have
no alternative." Mr. Lorentzen, with either Scandinavian reserve or
the tact and restraint of a foreign guest, further remarked with respect
to the payments, that the "... large payments passing from one line to
the other is not healthy .... ,113 If a private citizen rather than a foreign
government were involved in a comparable transfer of funds where no
service whatever was rendered by the payee and under comparable
compulsion of non-market circumstances, far more vigorous and de-
scriptive words than this mild understatement could be used to iden-
tify the enrichment.
The end-product of both negotiations was an agreement requiring
approval by the Commission before it could be performed.14
Another agreement was recently before the Commission for
approval covering Brazilian commerce in coffee and cocoa.15 Its nego-
13 The record of these statements is quoted in 8 F.M.C. at 245 (1964).
14 Shipping Act § 15, 46 U.S.C. 814 (1916), provides that an agreement not approved
shall be unlawful and before approval and after disapproval it is unlawful to carry out
any such agreement. Only lawful agreements are exempted from the prohibitions of the
anti-trust laws. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890); 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11, 28 Stat. 510 (1890).
15In Inter-American Freight Conference, No. 68-10 (F.M.C. Sept. 4, 1970), the Com-
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tiation was likewise time-consuming and full of mutual accusation of
malpractices in the trade as proof of the maladjustments that seem to
accompany these agreements.16
A struggle for government-granted privilege, a negotiation pitting
government welfare against commercial endeavor and a bargain that
embodies unequal advantages, all penalize private enterprise. How
these penalizing conditions are detrimental to carriers and create dis-
torted relations between carriers by making possible the creation of
unchanging market conditions and poor service is discussed next.
These cases have a common element: Private carriers experience
revenue losses as a preliminary condition because of non-commercially
associated causes in the form of governmental action. The losses are
followed by acquiescence with a government's announced objective.
The reality of power unrelated to service and performance is translated
into cash losses recoverable only by acquiescence to the power.
INEVITABLE CONFLICT BETWEEN A STATE TRADER NATION'S
WELFARE AND PRIVATE OCEAN CARRIER INTERESTS
When useful service or fair performance is penalized by being
pitted against the demands of another nation's welfare, serious concern
should be given to the conflict by our government before agreements
stemming from the conflict are approved. Our ocean carriers' interests
which are narrower than those of foreign nations make it most impor-
tant that the United States assume a burden of concern and establish
a few rules to govern the relation and the effect on commerce of future
clashes between the commercial needs of our carriers and the welfare
of foreign nations revealed by these facts.
Lawyers are interested in the legal impact of this conflict because
the 1916 Shipping Act,'7 requires the Commission to approve many
agreements needed to operate under those conditions before the agree-
ments may be performed.' The Commission is thus the means for
which this concern is made effective.
Validity of an agreement is established by fact and argument fol-
mission served its decision and report that two parties withdrew from the pooling agree-
ment prior to approval under section 15, therefore Commission jurisdiction terminated
and the proceeding was discontinued. Two Commissioners concurred and dissented.
16 A separate docket to investigate the alleged malpractices has been initiated. No.
68-44 (F.M.C. Nov. 18, 1970). Four separate dockets have been opened to deal with issues
surrounding these agreements.
17 39 Stat. 728, ch. 451 (1916), as amended 46 U.S.C. § 801 (1964).
18 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964) requires the Commission to approve all agreements which fix
or regulate transportation rates, regulate competition, pool earnings or traffic, regulate
sailings or provide for any kind of cooperative working arrangement unless certain con-
ditions exist.
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lowing an adjudication that it is not detrimental to commerce nor
unfair between carriers and that it is either an enforceable agreement
or generally not contrary to the "public interest."' 9
This article which has described some facts will now advance a few
arguments that ought to affect conclusions about detriments, unfairness
and public interest. Two propositions are offered to show that because
of the conflict between such unequal contracting parties the Commis-
sion ought to disapprove agreements with state traders unless some
equalizing United States government counterweight is present in the ne-
gotiating process. First, we have a public interest in the operation of the
private enterprise system of commerce that requires an absence of penal-
ties on the most useful maritime service possible. Restrictions on reve-
nues or quotas on products carried, unrelated to quality of service or
ability to serve, cause penalties as the result of agreements with state
traders which are detrimental to commerce and unfair as between ocean
carriers. Second, stability and continuity of commerce as a standard of
usefulness requires that parties to an agreement be accountable in the
courts of a country where disputes must be adjudicated. Certain well-
established legal principles make agreements of state traders unenforce-
able. Such agreements should not be considered true agreements under
the Act unless the state trader is first bound by treaty to subject itself
to the jurisdiction of our courts and regulatory agencies of government.
Either proposition and its conclusion is enough to assure disapproval
of agreements under the Act. Arguments in support of the first prop-
osition present considerations pertinent to issues in an administrative
proceeding before a regulatory agency such as the Commission, and
arguments in support of the second proposition relate to jurisdictional
issues appropriate for judicial review.
The rightness of any commercial practice, maritime or otherwise,
ought to be judged by a standard of usefulness: methods, not values,
ought to be the test of relative utility of a commercial practice. The
methods of commerce ought to be objectively ascertainable by a factual
showing that the easiest, least expensive, least damaging to property
and most expeditious way of moving goods is the most useful one.
Penalties on useful commerce occur when struggles for special privilege
replace the struggle for wealth through technical improvement and
better service, when commercial negotiation is elevated to an issue of
national policy and prestige, and when enforcement of obligations is
uncertain because of conflicting national interests.
Restricting the number of ocean carriers using a country's ports,
19 Shipping Act § 15, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1916).
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the amount of cargo each may carry, the revenues each may earn, and
the method of conducting their business generally, except as required
for a clear public interest, inevitably results in fights for the conferral
of government privilege on favored carriers rather than in competition
for business based on service improvement. Government sanction of
agreements promoting struggles for privilege will require that the
principle of privilege instead of usefulness be extended to other areas
of commerce. Serious long term effects on our commerce can result
from these developments affecting decisions as to what are detriments
to commerce. Seeking privilege is bad enough, but it also becomes an
unequal contest when the government as one of the parties is also the
dispenser of the privilege and the contract enforcer. This is the major
problem with the state trader.
Even without a shift to a struggle for privilege there is also an
underlying difficulty in just negotiating an agreement between a for-
eign state-operated business and a private business before a contract
obligation exists because, as the Brazilian negotiators proved, the nego-
tiation inevitably involves one nation's organs of public policy and its
public welfare on the one hand and a private citizen with only self-
interest and profit making responsibilities on the other. We are never
dealing with negotiations and disputes between equals who may be
subjected to uniformly applicable laws by the courts and regulations by
agencies of government, but with foreign governments which are not
subject to such laws. A situation of such inequality and diversity of
interests makes irreconcilable conflict inevitable unless bargaining
power is enhanced. When the normal concessions of interest in private
commerce, which among equals are bargaining points before an agree-
ment is reached, are raised to the level of policy and welfare, the issues
of conflicting public versus private interest are almost infinitely ex-
panded. Every dispute, instead of being only the rare dispute, becomes
a threat to public welfare to be resolved by time-consuming diplomacy
involving national prestige-a highly undesirable situation for the
expeditious flow of commerce through speedy negotiation of contracts.
If there is any one fundamental need for the orderly conduct of
commerce it must be respect for the obligation of the contract and its
enforceability. Enforcement by the courts of any nation will help, and
is necessary, but will work only if the strains of inequality in exchanges
are minimized. No amount of enforcement will prevent breaches if the
penalties on performance become excessive, and only relative equality
of bargaining power and stability of values exchanged will diminish
the strains and generate respect for the obligations undertaken. Agree-
1971]
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ments between state agencies and private citizens are most vulnerable
to the strains of inequality and resentment of overreaching power ex-
ercised, and cause suspicion where disputes are adjudicated by one of
the parties, such as a state trading nation. Self-restraint by nations may
make a few agreements work, but self-imposed restraint is not reliable
especially where political or cultural systems are widely variant and
prone to hostility.
PENALIZING RESTRICTIONS By GOVERNMENTS
IMPEDE COMMERCE
A. The restrictions are detrimental to commerce
The restricting effect of state trader domination of the bargaining,
shown by the examples, caused the imposition of an unchanging market
relationship for the period of the agreements. By the decrees both
countries gave their national lines control over the entire market for
the selected products before bargaining even started. They used the
power as a formidable bargaining advantage. The entire market is
normally not controlled by any one person having a monopoly, but is
influenced by many participants who compete for shares that are
constantly shifting with sales efforts, public tastes, technical changes
and other influences. Entry into the trade by new venturers is there-
after restricted. As long as the market is larger than any one partici-
pant and is more or less subject to change, each carrier is protected by
his own historically accumulated influence based on the known quality
of his service in relation to his prices, even though where a conference
(an association of carriers who agree among themselves on the rates
they will charge) is involved, price is a less significant factor. Even here
newcomers or "independent" carriers are protected by this innovative
ability. These considerations are familiar ones used as arguments
against monopolies and restraints of trade, but have current relevance
to what is now happening. Domination of access to, and division of, the
market through control of loading permits or tax exemption made the
state trader both a participant and the controller of the entire market -
a role usually reserved to government acting in the general public in-
terest without the self-interest of a participant. There is no longer any
diversity between public and private interest. The controller of the
entirety can wrest any agreement he wants from those dependent on
him for participation. The only limit on the state trader's bargaining
power was its ability to provide capacity regardless of quality or price.
Government control is absolute, whereas with the semi-monopolistic
control of a conference, some flexibility remains either through intra-
conference rivalry on the basis of quality or threats of independent
[Vol. 46:48
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service. An unchanging static condition is unrealistic in its disregard of
shifting influences and is productive of incipient strains among the
inevitably dissatisfied adherents to the agreement (such as the Norwe-
gian carrier), or the excluded (such as Alcoa), or the coffee shippers
denied choices based on their needs.
Having achieved control, the two state traders with their contented
allies were in a position by a single agreement to revise the entire power
structure of the particular segment of commerce which is no longer
subject to the influence of shippers or other carriers. Historic positions,
achieved through years of investment and sales effort and business re-
lationships with proven past usefulness, were altered immediately by
the might behind the dominating signatures. Market shares were
subject to future diminution or increase with no sales effort whatever
and exporter-importer choices became irrelevant. It would be hard
to withhold sympathy for the pained astonishment of the importer
witness who said that the latest proposed Brazilian agreement stifled
competition with a "brand new concept." "In the past nations who
wanted to build up a carrier have done so in the normal form of doing
business, starting out carrying a commodity and performing a record
and building it up. This one doesn't make that necessary at all."'20
Shipper choices of carrier service are no longer a major factor,
changes in public tastes may not be responded to directly, and improved
technical alternatives have minimal importance. None of these condi-
tions is useful to anyone except the privileged parties, but will exist
nevertheless and produce the uneasy strains on the static condition
created by the dominators. Detriment to commerce through impedi-
ments to easy accommodation is thus an expensive result.
An open market is, of course, only theoretical, does not exist in
practice, and where conferences operate, it is most restricted. An ideal
starting point is not necessary, however. Where the state trader is
present it is guaranteed that there will be no freedom whatever to
compete and the penalty of a static condition is absolute. The detri-
ment caused by such restriction is unjustified by any circumstances,
which is not the case with conferences, however non-ideal they may be.
Conferences, like the democratic system, are the worst form of control
i.e., except for the alternatives.
B. Restrictions produce unfairness between carriers
Quota restrictions imposed on carriers cause expensive service.
When efficient carriers,,suchasonr nAmericancamriers, restrict them-
2OSupra note 15, transcript at 1534. '  L -
U,. :.5"" 'FL,:
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selves to a prescribed quota, even if it is voluntary, there is a waste of
productive ability and good service is penalized for the benefit of the
bad service as the Brazilians acknowledged. 21 When bad service is en-
larged by quota imposed by government intervention there is an added
expensive waste. The generous quota holders have no need to try
harder.22 The expansion of the fleets of the more efficient carriers will
not be needed because the ships which might otherwise be pushed out
of service might just as well be used since efficiency is no longer a factor.
New investment and new shipyard work is sidetracked and delayed.
The unfairness is so obvious that the aggressive, efficient carriers some-
times take over the quotas of the less efficient and pay them what the
better ones would earn if they carried all they were allowed under an
open market. Revenue is spent unnecessarily this way and the money
comes "off the top," i.e., out of potential profits. Very likely this money
made up the extortionate near-million dollar payment possible in the
coffee trade. All of this non-market inefficiency is progress wasted for
the benefit of the powerful but less efficient and is unfair to the non-
privileged.
As if this injury is not enough, erosion of their own stockholders
equity by our own contented and privileged carriers seems extraordi-
narily shortsighted. By taking the short-term gains afforded by these
agreements they obtain stability and profit only for the short period the
agreements work satisfactorily. The profitability won't last long under
the continuing strains imposed by shippers who may insist on more for
their money and won't hesitate to seek less restricted, wasteful areas for
their business. The managers who make these agreements do so at the
expense of their investors. New investors will not be so shortsighted
and investment requiring long-term stability will not be put to risk in
a market abused by short-term influences over which they have so lit-
tle control because of governmental compulsions. The more watchful
stockholders will sell out, diminishing further the capital-attracting
potential of the company. The vagaries of political action will thus be
avoided.
Shippers and investors represent a public interest in useful, effi-
cient service and waste, causing them loss, creates unfairness to shippers
and to the public, in addition to intercarrier unfairness between the
efficient and the inefficient.
It is useful that relative equality between carriers who are con-
21 8 F.M.C. at 245.
22 For example, a witness testified regarding "horrible" service and the carrier had
an opportunity to "improve their service and they did not." Supra note 15, at 1561.
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tract bargainers be maintained to assure a constant reflection of ability
to realize cost savings by the efficient. The purpose behind fair trade
and anti-monopoly laws is this usefulness. Inevitably the relation be-
tween a private citizen and the State is that of an applicant and a dis-
penser of public privilege and protection, not a relation of equals. In
judging such agreements we ought to recognize the spurious character
of agreements with state traders who are only secondarily carriers.
Agreements dominated by non-commercial factors such as public wel-
fare do not reflect true or useful exchanges of value because the reality
of the power unrelated to service and performance translates itself into
immediate commercial loss for the less powerful citizen, particularly
a foreigner. It is unfair as between carriers where one of them is gov-
ernmental since the role of one party is not essentially commercial, but
rather the reflection of public welfare of a foreign nation.
Discrimination is another factor of unfairness the Commission is
responsible for considering. There is not only a subordinate relation,
but a contradiction between private enterprise commerce and the pub-
lic control exercised by state traders. The former relies on the govern-
ment for maintaining non-discriminatory trading conditions, but the
latter depends on a discriminatory condition as a basic condition of
trade. There is nothing wrong with discrimination where state trading
exists; on the contrary, it is to be expected, but we have to acknowl-
edge the expected discrimination contradicts our standards of non-
discrimination. Therefore, adjustments are going to have to be made
if this commerce is to go on, but the fundamental inequality will make
non-discriminatory opportunity virtually impossible.
In spite of the questionable character of these agreements they
are going to continue to be presented for approval. The suggestion is
offered that the best that can be done is to equalize the bargaining
power of the participants. It is suggested that in the future the Govern-
ment through representatives of the Department of State participate
in, or oversee, all negotiations for agreements with state traders and
that these representatives be authorized to use the bargaining might
of this country to equalize any shortcomings in the power balance.2 3
The Commission might refuse to regard any agreement as being fair
as between carriers unless the Government was a part of the negotia-
tions with state traders and on conclusion of negotiations the Depart-
23 The suggestion does not apply where a nation does not operate or manage a
shipping line, but entrusts this function to financially responsible private companies
which may use state-owned ships.
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ment of State verified that equality was achieved before agreements
were closed.24
C. Two Recently Approved Agreements Validate the Penalties
The two more recently approved Brazilian revenue pooling agree-
ments are noteworthy and require special comment because they ex-
emplify further the objectionable features of restrictive agreements
compelled by conflicting national welfare and bargaining inequality. 25
The Federal Maritime Commission report accompanying approval does
not accept the arguments of this article and contains suggestions of use
of the powers of the President without his permission and of disregard
of a recent, but subsequent Presidential request for Congressional "sup-
port for policies aimed at securing a more open world trading system."26
An agreement which limits the amount of cargo some carriers may
transport, pools revenues, requires exchange of manifests and shipping
documents, and fixes rates between competitors is restrictive even if
it is legal under the Shipping Act. Whatever else a restrictive agree-
ment is, it does not embody a policy of securing a more open world
trading system. Restrictiveness is antithetical to openness even if it is
legal as the Commission proclaims.
The Commission's latest report takes its stand on "realities of the
trades" as a justification for opposing a policy of more open trad-
ing. The trades are the ocean shipping routes between Brazil and
the United States Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico ports. The agreements
in question are "necessary under present conditions" the report says.
To support its case the Commission chose an irrelevant reality, left
out some realities that might conflict with its premises, and ignored
24 Governmental participation in negotiations has in fact been found to be essential in
the latest rounds of Brazilian coffee pool negotiations. See note 18 supra; U.S.-Brazil Ocean
Cargo Plan Expected to Cause an Uproar, J. oF COMMERcE, March 16, 1970, at 1. The
incident provides a good example of the undesirable, time consuming negotiations involv-
ing public welfare required to conclude agreements with state traders. A subordinate
official in the Department of Commerce went to Brazil and worked out a "guideline plan"
embodied in what was in effect an international agreement with Brazilian maritime offi-
cials. There was no mention of any State Department participation, but the two govern-
ments agreed through their signatories, on guidelines for shipments, to take certain other
actions and to consult before terminating specified provisions of the agreement. This
activity by government officials has several highly undesirable aspects: First, it seems to
involve a misuse of the President's powers, if not to lack any authorization under the
merchant marine or other laws; second, it is selective and discriminatory in application
because it applies only to the negotiations of the chosen carriers; and, third, it regulates
the single agreement without any published standards applicable other agreements. Such
activity also diverts attention from the more fundamental problems, and leads to a
belief something is being done to solve them.
26Agreement Nos. 9847 & 9848- Revenue Pools, United States/Brazil Trade, No.
70-30 (F.M.C. 1970); reconsideration denied, 12 S.R.1. 178 (1971).
26 The Washington Post, Dec. 31, 1970, at D6.
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some higher realities and necessities influencing conclusions about
American public interest and detriments to commerce, and about the
use of Presidential powers.
The irrelevant reality was that "certain Scandinavian lines have
likewise entered into agreements with Brazilian lines which apportion
the cargo carried in the trades between South America and their own
countries," thus showing a willingness to participate in such agree-
ments. The issue is not what foreign carriers are willing to do in other
parts of the world under different laws and public policies. The rel-
evant issue is what the Commission, within the confines of the Shipping
Act and our own public policy, approves as being in the public interest
of the United States.
An omitted conflicting reality is that by favoring two American
flag lines in the Brazil trade and by disfavoring Norwegian and Swedish
flag lines the Commission is simply ignoring inevitable retaliatory dis-
favoring of American flag lines in the Norway and Sweden trade. No
facts bearing on this potential detriment to overall U.S. trade are intro-
duced and the ultimate effect of a policy of primary allegiance to
particular carriers in one trade just because they are American, rather
than a policy of open allegiance to all carriers in our merchant marine,
may not be in the general public interest and may be a commercial
detriment to many other American-flag carriers. Expediency of this
sort has only short-lived benefits.
The ignored higher realities are those discussed in this article.
They are the disadvantages of approving agreements which substitute
a struggle for privilege for the competitive struggle and which inhibit
commercial change by preserving a status quo. The events leading up
to the agreements followed the classic pattern disclosed in this article.
A decree in 1969 "resulted in a loss of cargo" followed by acquiescence
to the consequences of the exercise of power causing the loss. The
Commission's approval of the ensuing agreement, acknowledging the
power and the loss, is based on lack of evidence that the competitive
situation will be changed to any significant degree by approval and
on a conclusion that "it does not appear that the status quo will be
appreciably altered...." The tacit approval of an unchanging compet-
itive situation and the non-alterable status quo is precisely what is
wrong with approval of these agreements, not what is right about them.
No competitive position can be changed and status quo is thought
to be in the public interest and an aid to stability in commerce. How-
ever, unchanging status quo, is not the same thing as stability, as the
report apparently assumes. Stability is related to fair competitive prac-
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tice, not to guaranteed success and profitability. Fair competitive prac-
tices help prevent extreme fluctuations in rates. If this argument is
wrong and status quo is the same thing as stability, it must be the
stability of the tomb for someone. No matter how hard some carriers
may try they are to be shut out of 80 to 85 percent of the trade in the
name of stability. United States and Brazilian lines through "this equal
access provision which is the heart of the agreements" are clear winners
in the struggle for privilege assuring them of "80 to 85 percent United
States and Brazilian Government-controlled cargo moving in the trade."
The reality of privilege secured from government restriction and the re-
sultant status quo replaces the higher realities of open competition. The
ignored realities require the exact opposite of a condition in which no
significant degree of change is possible and status quo is protected -
not a useful method of commerce.
Misuse of the President's authority over foreign relations is the
overlooked subject having still other consequences. The report refers
to a "Memorandum of Consultation" agreed to by United States and
Brazilian representatives. Identities and authorizations of signatories
on the "Memorandum" are not disclosed.27 The "Memorandum" en-
dorses the approved division of up to 85% of the government con-
trolled cargo moving in the trade on a fifty-fifty basis between the
ships of the two nations, and excludes open, multi-nation participation
on an unlimited basis under the "equal access" obligation. Perhaps
some thought was given to international relations aspects of "equal
access," but the report does not indicate any Presidential review of
approval of the agreements, nor the consequences thereof. Perhaps
it was thought the approval was consistent with our cargo-preference
laws,28 but the approval goes well beyond these statutory authoriza-
tions without visible Presidential approval because the cargo-preference
laws apply only to U.S. government controlled cargo which must be
carried in U.S. registered ships. The laws are silent as to preferences,
reciprocal or otherwise, for non-government cargo and the use of for-
27 See note 24 supra. The title of the "Memorandum of Consultation" dissembles its
real scope because it contained far more than just notes about a consultation and contained
agreements to perform specific actions. The absence of identification of the signatories
to this memorandum conceals further and contrasts with the explicit identification of a
named person who was a subordinate official in the Maritime Administration, a subordinate
agency in the Department of Commerce, with respect to an earlier "Memorandum of
Understanding." In both cases neither official had authority over foreign affairs negotiations
at least in the absence of any visible State Department participation.
28 46 U.S.C. § 1241b (1964); Merchant Marine Act § 901(b) (1936); as amended 49
Stat. 2015, § 901, and the Agricultural Development Act, Pub. L. No. 480, which provides
that surplus agricultural products moving into foreign countries be carried 50-50 on U.S.
registered ships.
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eign registered ships. Under a strict construction of the statutes the
silence of the laws means an absence of authority and the void can be
filled only by the President's much broader authority over foreign re-
lations under the Constitution. There is no authorization to limit the
remaining cargo that may be carried in foreign ships to the ships of only
one or two nations.
Finally, a puzzling aspect of the report was that after endorsing
a "requirement" of the Shipping Act that all carriers regardless of
flag "be accorded equal treatment" the commission held that restricting
three Norwegian and Swedish line ships in the southbound trade to
15 to 20 percent of the total cargo and dividing the remaining between
the favored two American and three Brazilian carriers, was equality
of treatment. Three out of eight carriers are compelled to divide one-
fifth or less of the trade between them. There is no way that the equa-
tion works to produce equality on these figures. The solution may be
"fair" or in the "public interest" or not "detrimental" to commerce
within the precedents interpreting the Shipping Act, but it is not equal
treatment.
The Commission recently refused to reconsider its approval of the
Brazilian coffee pooling agreements, but added some new reporting
requirements. The Commission denied the charge that its decision was
"grounded on international politics rather than regulation." The Com-
mission insisted its decision was based on "commercial and economic
factors." What it persists in refusing to see, however, is that the earlier
"commercial realities" and now the "commercial and economic fac-
tors" are in reality superior governmental action by Brazil. The Com-
mission pretends that these realities are not the use of governmental
power by a state trader, and as long as this pretense creates an inability
to distinguish between governmental power behind the state trader
and commercial market place action without this power there is ap-
parently little hope for the administration's trade policies being ex-
ecuted by the Commission at least along the South American trade
routes in coffee.
Tim AGREEMENTS ARE UNENFORCEABLE
An historically established doctrine of law, developed primarily
through cases involving our ocean shipping business, is that foreign
nations are immune from suit.29 Legal issues arise only when the iden-
tity of the sovereign status of a party is not apparent as when a ship
29 Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pessaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); The Schooner Exchange v. Mc-
Fadden, 11 US. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
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is libelled,80 or a business association is complained against and the
sovereign's presence is called to the court's attention by way of de-
fense.81 In such instances, the sovereignty issue has to be decided to
the exclusion of the merits of a case.
The rule of law which protects sovereigns is opposed to concern
for rights of property and for the redress of wrongs to private persons,
because it allows parties to escape being made answerable to complaints
of wrongdoing. Consequently, qualifications have been developed to
accommodate this concern. In the case of ships, possession as well as
ownership, by the sovereign has been held to be essential to the de-
fense.82 Corporations distinct from government agencies, wherein gov-
ernment only has a partial interest, have been denied the defense of
immunity.38 Immunity will be considered as waived under certain
circumstances.8 4
The courts have also deferred to the executive branch for a de-
termination of whether sovereignty claims should be absolute or qual-
ified. Where executive predominance has prevailed the determination
of immunity status may be regarded as conclusive.8 5 The determination
of immunity, however, must be clear and unambiguous and not just
a transmittal of a foreign government's claim of immunity with a
"suggestion."8 6
Deferral to the executive means deferral to the Department of
State as the executive agency responsible for receiving and informing
the courts of immunity claims. The Department has established a
distinction between foreign agencies engaged in commercial activities
and those engaged in governmental activities. It has pre-announced
30 Ex parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522 (1921).
81 Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United States, 71 F.2d 524 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
32 Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945). The S.S. Baia California owned by Mexico
had been delivered to a private operator for five years for his commercial use. A libel was
sustained and claimed immunity by Mexico not recognized because the sovereign was not
truly being sued.
33 Ulen & Co. v. Bank Gospodarstwa Karajowego, 261 App. Div. 1, 24 N.Y.S. 2d 201
(2d Dep't 1940). Suit to recover on unpaid bond interest coupons. The defendant bank
claimed to be an instrumentality of the Polish government which owned 60% of its shares.
Held: a corporation for commercial objects in which a government is interested does
not share the immunity of the sovereign. In Amtorg the corporation was 100% foreign
owned, but was organized under New York laws. Immunity was not allowed.
84 Dexter & Carpenter v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F. 2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930). An
agency of the Swedish government sued for breach of contract for the sale of coal, and
lost. Its actions were considered a waiver of immunity and it could be sued on a
counter-claim.
35 Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). A Peruvian corporation as an agent of the
government was sued for breach of a charter agreement. The proceeding was against the
SS Ucayali in rem. The State Department recognized the claim of immunity and made
a presentation to the court. The court held the district court should release the ship on
the basis of the presentation of facts by the Department.
86 Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
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that in reviewing activities in connection with its determination of
whether sovereignty claims should be absolute or not and with its
referral of foreign immunity claims to the courts to call their attention
to the available defense, the Department will adopt a "restrictive the-
ory of sovereign immunity." 37 The Department views its role as an
evaluator of foreign claims rather than as a transmitter of foreign
government messages.
The difficulty with such announcements and the assumption of
the specialized role of evaluator which are intended to be helpful, is
that they do not help at all because a court is not interested in theory,
but only in the result of making a decision one way or the other.
A foreign government is not going to be controlled by any such uni-
lateral evaluations based on announcements. Court judgments, whether
based on the judge's conclusions or on executive predominance, are
based on our own legal precedents. Most judgments settle disputes
between claimants and award damages, but as far as a foreign nation
is concerned a judgment does not settle anything unless there is advance
consent to abide by it. It is a delusion to fail to recognize the fun-
damental difference between adjustment of domestic conflict and ad-
justment of conflict with foreigners and their business, particularly
where the apparent business entity is the foreign nation itself. Sover-
eign immunity among nations is an assertion of the fact of power,
not a domestic theory of law.
In recognition of the justness of the concern for the rights of
property and a need to redress wrongs, the nation as a whole has
negotiated treaty qualifications to accommodate the concern over the
rights of each other's citizens. For example, the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation with Italy provides:
No enterprise... which is publicly owned or controlled shall, if it
engages in .... shipping or other business activities within the
territories of the other High Contracting Party, claim or enjoy,
either for itself or for its property, immunity therein.., from suit,
from execution of judgment, or from any other liability to which
a privately owned and controlled enterprise is subject therein.8
87 26 DEP'T OF STATE BuLL. 984-85 (1952). The State Department's theories seem to be
based on inapplicable reasoning and not apt to be persuasive to foreigners. The Depart-
ment's Acting Legal Adviser's reasoning compares governmental waiver of immunity for
domestic purposes such as for admiralty, contract and tort claims to prove that traditional
doctrines of sovereign immunity are outmoded. The conclusion has a logical consistency if
the premise is correct, but it is not correct because the tvo types of immunity are en-
tirely different and are not comparable. Sovereign immunity between nations has nothing to
do with the rights .of citizens vis-a-vis their government and is related only to the
practical needs of nations to avoid the consequences of retaliation if immunity is not
respected. The private citizen has no such power of an equal.
88 Feb. 2, 1948, art. xxiv, par. 6, 63 Stat. 2255 (1948).
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Absent any treaty, the assertion of the fact of power conveyed to courts
by the Department of State may not be a satisfactory way of adjudi-
cating the rights of aggrieved parties, but at least it recognizes the
unequal and superior claims of the nation as a whole over the rights
of litigants. Vindication of litigants' rights is a worthy objective, but
it must be achieved in other ways. No doubt, absolute immunity is
unworkable under today's conditions. The problem is whether it should
be qualified unilaterally or multi-laterally by agreement as to how
far each nation may go. So far the United States has gotten by with
few such agreements, but the hazards of confrontation increase the
hazards of our ocean carriers as they begin dealing with more power-
ful nations which may take a more vindictive approach to being sued
than has been the case.
The difficulty with the Department's procedure and the existing
court precedents is that state traders now have at least a chance to win
their case if they follow the procedures long enough, by inducing
support of immunity claims by Departmental officials. If they are
unsuccessful they can then resort to their retailiatory sanctions, but
our own nationals even in our courts always lose if immunity is granted
at any stage and the losses must become added expenses of business-
no help to commerce. All the procedures and precedents do where
immunity is not recognized is uphold the validity of service of summons
on the state trader and compel it to present its case. A judgment may
result, but the claim still may not be vindicated by payment of damages.
No case where there is a levy and execution against state traders has
been found.
Two other impediments to a successful adjudication exist which
assure further expense caused by uncertainty as to the status of an
agreement in spite of a trial. First, a true presentation of the facts is
not always possible. Evidentiary proofs located abroad need not be
produced. 9 Second, vindication of rights is frustrated unless the state
trader's property can be seized by a levy in execution of a judgment. 40
39 Calcutta E. Coast of India & E. Pakistan/U.S.A. Conf. v. FMC, 399 F.2d (D.C. Cir.
1968); FMC v. DeSmedt, 866 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966);
Kerr S.S. Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1960), appeal dismissed, 369 U.S. 422 (1962);
Societe Internationale v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1955) (dismissed for failure to
produce documents), rev'd sub nom. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958);
FMC v. DeSmedt, 268 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); in re Investigation of World Arrange-
ments, 13 F.R.D. 280 (1952); Alleged Rebates of Mitsui SS. Co. Ltd., 7 F.M.C. 248
(1962). These and other cases show an unbroken line of failures to obtain evidence from
abroad except by voluntary consent.
40 Chemical Nat. Resources v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864, cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1966). Genuine compulsion by a Venezuelan government agency re-
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By prior agreement a bond should be required or property held for
satisfaction of judgments. Other levies in execution have been tried
and failed.41
Even the "restrictive theory" of sovereign immunity still leaves
residual impossibility abroad beyond any control within the United
States. The status of the parties before a court is unequal both in law
and in fact, and the consequence of this inequality can never be elim-
inated, but only modified by offsetting action. The Commission is the
only agency that can make the first move to assert the unapprovability
of the agreements as a consequence of the inequality and the Depart-
ment of State is the agency to initiate the offsetting action.
The consequences of the immunity doctrine and the confusion
over how it will be asserted in any particular case and whether a judg-
ment is collectible or workable today, are that contracts with state
traders are compacts of uncertain status which are either detrimental
to commerce or lacking in the qualities of a true agreement subject to
Commission approval.
What would be the status of agreements such as the ones with
Venezuela and Brazil if the carriers later damaged someone by failure
to perform, or were adjudicated to be subject to damages and their
ships or other property seized? Suppose they overcarried their quotas
and refused to pay other carriers the penalty for overcarrying? Would
they claim sovereign immunity as Italy, Mexico, the U.S.S.R. and Po-
land did with regard to their shipping interests? 42 It would take a
brave lawyer to advise his client as to whether he could collect dam-
ages on the basis of existing precedents.
As long as foreign nations and their state traders choose to honor
their agreements no trouble is expected, but the cost of business is
uncertain to the extent that remedies against foreign nations are mat-
ters of grace, not right.
suiting in a group boycott of American commerce is a complete defense to a treble damage
suit under the anti-trust laws where the Venezuelan government was responsible for the
group boycott. Trade practices dictated by a foreign government are acts of a sovereign
beyond U.S. jurisdiction. Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp.
1291 (D. Del. 1970).
41 Dexter & Carpenter v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930). Even
though Sweden was held not immune from suit because of waiver of immunity, an order
of attachment on its property was vacated and its property held not subject to execution.
See also New York & Cuba M.S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
42 See notes 29, 31-33; see also Low v. S.S. Rossia, 1948 A.M.C. 814 (S.D.N.Y.) where an
injured passenger libelled a Soviet ship, but on the Ambassador's presentation of a claim
of sovereign immunity the case was dismissed without even an inquiry as to the true facts
of ownership of the vessel.
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Sources of instability caused by differing notions about the sov-
ereign immunity of state traders will also vary in degree depending
on how much the political philosophy of the particular country is
governed by the imperatives of doctrines which dominate its economic
life, further increasing the difficulties and uncertainties for our car-
riers. Nations with appointive leadership may be less flexible to chang-
ing commercial needs.
Instability caused by the applicability of entirely different stand-
ards of enforceability of agreements by state traders dictates a review
of their agreements by the Commission under entirely different stand-
ards from those used to approve or disapprove private agreements.
Rather than attempt to correct all these impediments of instability
the Commission might simply refuse to recognize the products of such
unequal, penalty-laden, bargains as lacking the binding character of
an agreement cognizable under section 15 of the Shipping Act, unless
the stated preconditions based on Department of State verifications
exist. In such a case the basic impediments would not be corrected,
but at least the bad effects would be neutralized.
SUMMARY
Certain anti-competitive agreements between ocean carriers, il-
legal under the acts to protect trade and commerce against unlawful
restraints and monopolies, commonly called the antitrust laws may be
approved by the Commission pursuant to the 1916 Shipping Act, and
by approval be excepted from the provisions of the antitrust laws. The
original assumption of the Shipping Act was that agreements subject
to such approval would be between private citizen international or
domestic common carriers by water in foreign commerce. Today many
of these ocean common carriers are not private citizens, but agencies of
foreign governments or state traders armed with governmental powers.
The governmental powers of state traders are used in negotiating
agreements to the serious disadvantage of American private citizen
ocean carriers. Our government ought to recognize the inferiority of
our carriers which must negotiate these agreements armed only with
economic power normal to the free enterprise system and that the in-
feriority caused distorted results in the market for ocean transport
services. The unequal negotiating process converts normal competi-
tive bargaining to a struggle for special government conferred privi-
lege instead of a struggle for trade based on quality of service. The
government should equalize the inequality as a condition of approval
of agreements. If an agreement, without negotiating assistance, estab-
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lishes non-commercial restrictions on trade it penalizes useful com-
merce to the point of being detrimental to commerce and unfair
between carriers and ought to be disapproved by the Maritime Com-
mission and exposed to prosecution of the participants under the anti-
trust laws. Antitrust immunity should not be conferred on unequal
anti-competitive bargains imposed by state traders on our free enter-
prise market system. Even if an agreement is approved and given anti-
trust immunity we might also recognize the legal impediments to such
agreements being considered true enforceable contracts.
The sovereign immunity doctrine with its qualifications and un-
certain application coupled with the absolute power of a foreign na-
tion, not bound by treaty, to defeat claims for faulty performance
raise the question whether agreements with state traders should not be
considered unenforceable compacts which either (a) ought to be con-
sidered against public interest and detrimental to commerce because
of instabilities and uncertainties shown to exist, or (b) ought not to
be regarded as true agreements unless treaty unqualifiedly subjects
state traders and their property to American jurisdiction.
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